Human capability evaluation approach for cybersecurity in critical industrial infrastructure by Ani, Uchenna P. et al.
Human Capability Evaluation Approach
for Cyber Security in Critical Industrial
Infrastructure
Uchenna P. Daniel Ani, Hongmei Mary He and Ashutosh Tiwari
Abstract Every organization is as frail as its frailest human link in the cyber
security of Industry Control System (ICS), which is without predisposition to
conceivable technological solutions for enforcing security. Noticeably, human-
involved systems are becoming more chaotic, and gravely under attacks due to
irregular actions or inactions of human entities in the constituent chain. Many
industrial cyber-attacks have successfully defeated technological security solutions
through preying on human weaknesses in knowledge and skills, and manipulating
insiders within organizations into unsuspectingly delivering entry and access to
sensitive industrial assets. In order to help enterprises assess the level of employees’
cyber security awareness and responsiveness, and enhance ICS Cyber security
knowledge and skills for ICS protection, a Workforce Cyber Security Capability
evaluation model is presented, and theoretically validated. A capability evaluation
will allow industries to have a better understanding of the potential state of con-
sciousness, readiness and diagnostic abilities of the industries; thus improve the
prevention, detection, and response to any cyber-speciﬁc incidents.
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1 Introduction
While IoT technologies are bringing exciting beneﬁts to Industry in real-time data
and process management, it also yields a remarkable increase in cyber threats,
vulnerabilities and risks. Large organizations, corporations, industries and busi-
nesses are continually investing huge in the development of technologies to protect
their control system infrastructure (information, services and networks). However,
the technical outcomes in Cyber security need the endorsement of the workforce in
an organization. If the workforce do not understand and/or play their roles in the
security design of the organisation. Cyber security assurance for industrial control
systems (ICSs) and networks goes beyond the institution of antivirus, ﬁrewalls, and
intrusion detection/prevention systems (ID/PS), etc. Even with updated technolo-
gies, stern security procedures, and high skilled IT security experts; it is still pos-
sible that an organisation would yet be unable to attain desired security without the
improvement of security awareness of employees in the whole organisation.
Essentially, Cyber security is described as technologies and processes that are
developed to protect computers, their hardware and software, networks and data [1],
from unlawful access to the Internet by cyber criminals, hackers and terrorists [2].
In this work, Cyber security is deﬁned as the ‘harmonisation of capabilities in
people, processes, and technologies; to secure and control both authorised and/or
unlawful access, disruption, or destruction of electronic computing systems
(hardware, software, and networks), the data and information they hold. This
deﬁnition stems from a perceptual view of the classic composition of a typical
electronic system; comprising of three key collaborating entities: People, Process
and Technology [3]—Fig. 1. The triad is considered prime to the ‘success’ of every
value provisioning digital system [4]. Here, success implies effective cyber-secure
operations that guarantee pre-set system objectives. Figure 1 shows the intersecting
results of employing security solutions that capture all 3 elements. The widening of
this intersection implies greater Cyber security efﬁciency and assurance
Conversely, most current improvement efforts tend to focus on singular entities,
flouting the others. Most information security solutions tend to focus more on
technology strategies; discounting the people and process aspects [5]. Consequently,
whatever enhancement initiative(s) targeted do not usually get achieved optimally
Fig. 1 System-collaborative entities for effective cyber security
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and durably due to the prejudiced approached adopted. This work focuses on the
‘People’ aspect; characterising issues of communications, knowledge, skillsets,
behaviour, and relationships that deﬁne the human elements of an industrial critical
infrastructure [3].
1.1 Workforce-Related Cyber Security Issues
Numerous high-tech progressions in Cyber security for information technology
(IT), and operational technologies (OT) have enabled innovative monitoring and
detection of threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks. Even with the potentials and doles
of automation, the analytical competences of the human decision maker, through
exploitation of cognitive processes, are still exigent and indispensable [6–8]. Users
usually need to interact with technologies to manage system processes for better
results. Nevertheless, human fallibility in the interaction loop makes and ampliﬁes
the tendency for slip-ups, and by-passing of existing security measures [9]. Hence,
in spite of the massive deployment of technology solutions to protect ICSs, human
factors still play a very signiﬁcant role towards the implementation of desirable
cyber-secure ICS environment. Thus, effective solutions must also be engaged by
humans. While efforts continue to fortifying the technology piece of the large
puzzle, intelligent attack gazers have turned to the weak pieces, especially; the
people piece. Both amateurs and professional hackers now target people [9].
Potentially, the key security asset of an organization is often neither security
technologies, nor laws and regulations, but the workforce—the ‘people’ constituent
[10]. Thus, the security of industrial infrastructure and services through manifold
investments in money and time could be completely undermined, if this sector
(employees or users) fail to understand and uphold its roles in the security solution
of an organisation. An organisation is potentially as weak as its weakest workforce
in the operational chain [10–12], and most successful attacks have exploited these
shortcomings for their gain. These weak-links typically consist of expert control
and automation engineers, technicians, and corporate service personnel [9, 13], who
often ignore the importance of Cyber security, and are not keen to learn the
knowledge and skills in Cyber security.
Records show that cyber-attacks are truly on the upsurge, with human entities
being the most targeted vectors for malicious cyber actors. 36 % of the vilest
security breaches in 2013 were caused by human errors from PWC’s security
breach report [14]. 31 % of dreadful security breaches in 2015 were initiated by
human errors, and a further 20 % by purposeful misuses of systems still demon-
strating a character trait of users [9]. 80 % of the time, stolen credentials through
phishing are the root cause of data breaches [15]. While emphasizing the usability
of security technology as an ‘equivalent goal to the technology of security’ [16],
people are noted to be the frailest link in the security chain. Therefore, the human
within the ICS constituent chain pose a potential weak-link with high attraction to
emerging cyber threats and attacks.
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A human-involved approach is necessary to consolidate security levels within
the ICS domain. Awareness of cyber vulnerabilities can be increased through the
evaluation of the state of security awareness, and diagnostic abilities of the man-
ufacturing workforce to expect, spot and react to cyber-speciﬁc incidents within the
normal operational environment. Such evaluation could help to determine and
understand the workforce’s response aptitude to cyber-attacks. This leans on
building/enhancement of security capabilities (knowledge awareness and diagnostic
skills) of the workforce in ICS domain, which will obviously moderate the jobs of
IT-Security experts/group to response, repairs and or recovery. The assessment of
knowledge, and skills employs a proactive approach that would guide towards
amplifying the workforces’ security posture, and building better capabilities into the
workforce; for self-protection, preservation of organisational work, and a conscious
and cultured cyber-secure behaviour [10].
This discourse explores the potentials for understanding the aptitude of the
‘people’ constituent to supplement the overall efforts of attaining a cyber-secure
industrial environment. It is hypothesised that understanding the levels of knowl-
edge, skills, and capabilities of the workforce of an organisation is key to grasping
the overall organisation’s Cyber security capability and susceptibility, and devel-
oping a high-skilled cyber workforce. Hence, a quantiﬁable and scalable approach
for evaluating workforce cyber security capabilities (knowledge and diagnostic
skills) will provide a reference to the organisation security level. The remaining part
of this paper is outlined as follows; Sect. 2 reviews related work on cyber security
capability evaluation with respect to human factors. Section 3 presents the proposed
Workforce Cyber security Capability (WCSC) evaluation model, Sect. 4 presents
the concepts and results of the theoretical validation of the WCSC model, and
Sect. 5 presents the conclusions and future work.
2 Related Works in Cyber Security Capability Evaluation
Usually, an industrial organisation has a small team of IT experts, who manage its
IT systems and services. A greater proportion of the employees; typically opera-
tional technology (OT) skilled use these IT systems and services for routine tasks.
The improper use or abuse of these IT systems poses severe security risks to the
overall industrial system. Security risks, which could result from weak passwords
conﬁguration, improper use of personal mobile devices, unprotected web access,
inappropriate recognition and response to social engineering attacks, and several
other anomalies. Most members of these workforce are often unaware of these
security threats, hence, their actions could increase the risk of network intrusions,
viruses, worms and trojan infections, loss of service response and productivity, and
loss of proprietary and (or) conﬁdential business/organization’s information [10].
An essential step in the security scheme of organizations towards eliminating such
vulnerabilities caused by its workforce is to have an overall Cyber security
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assessment of its workforce. So that organisations could take corresponding steps to
improve capabilities gaps through training or practice.
Capability has been prescribed as the product of knowledge, skills, and tools
[17]. Although tools does describe capability on a generic context, it does not
directly indicate people use proﬁciencies. Only knowledge and skills do. However,
tools, as technology; may represent the attribute of an large organisation to cyber
security [5]. In fact, the attitude of an organisation on Cyber security often also lie
in the knowledge and skills that its workforce has. Knowledge and skills have the
valued characteristics that represent WCSC. Tools as a factor is not considered in
the proposed WCSC model because the model focuses on capturing direct human
proﬁciencies alone. Tools only factors in when considerations are made for
determine overall organizational Cyber security posture. Accordingly, the WCSC
model would be a function of the security knowledge and skills of employees in an
organisation. An evaluation model could help represent the workforces’ security
posture; build better capabilities for self-protection, work preservation, and culture
Cyber security-conscious behaviour [10].
An International Telecommunication Union ITU survey reported 54 out of the
62 respondents identiﬁed with the importance of Cyber security awareness in
achieving secure cyberspace [18]. Security ‘awareness’ is simply meant to
emphasis thoughtfulness on security, enabling individuals (workforce—employees
and managers) to recognise security concerns and respond accordingly [19].
A study also indicated that supplementary knowledge of Cyber security can
facilitate the spot-on detection of malicious cyber events and reduce the false
classiﬁcation of non-threatening cyber events as malicious [8]. Thus, skills can
guide users to make right decisions and actions capable of reducing or eliminating
the occurrence of malicious events. The assessment of cyber security capability is
quite instrumental towards achieving an efﬁcient workforce security consciousness
[10]. This could be done through different approaches, such as interviews (struc-
tured and semi-structured) [20], questionnaires [21], observations and gamiﬁca-
tions [8, 22], penetrations testing [23], etc. Although, several methods have
emerged for evaluating workforce features and capabilities in the context of cyber
security, we have not found any research that has offered a scheme of discrete
numerical model to represent a status of an individual or the entire organisation in
adhering to deﬁned or expected cyber security policies and/or standards.
3 The WCSC Evaluation Model
Reaching Cyber security assurance for ICS is partly dependent on the efﬁciency and
responsiveness of the workforce, which could produce a projection of organisa-
tional Cyber security capability, and guide human’s behaviour as expected. ICS
workforce can be roughly categorised to 3 parties; (i) IT security experts,
(ii) Engineers/Field Operators/Technicians, and (iii) Corporate Managers. For the
latter two, their behavioural activities often affect overall system security.
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WCSC is represented as a function of knowledge, and skills levels. Here,
knowledge level is deﬁned as the measure of information and theoretical under-
standing about recurrent cyber threats, vulnerabilities, attack patterns and impacts
to the target system that a user, employee or operator is working with. Skill level is
deﬁned as the ability to use accumulated knowledge either from experience or
training to spot or detect cyber-attack attempts, patterns and techniques, and the
degree, in which the user can respond timely with appropriate countermeasures.
While the knowledge level implies the consciousness to potential Cyber security
threats and possible economical loss from any unintentional or intentional errors,
the skill level builds a technical muscle into people to efﬁciently and appropriately
identify those threats, such that the damages and/or economical losses could be
avoided or mitigated. Essentially, WCSC evaluation needs to cover information
gathering, concerning the adherence to current/adopted security standards and
policies, operational processes, cyber security trends knowledge and skill gaps in
individual persons [24].
Figure 2 describes the process-flow of the WCSC Evaluation (WCSCE) model.
It begins with deﬁning ICS cyber security requirements relative to the functional
objectives of a host organisation, the adoption of suiting evaluation methodology,
Fig. 2 Workforce cyber security capability evaluation model
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tools, capability priority classiﬁcations, execution of the evaluation, and (re)pre-
sentation of results. The process is divided into two broad stages; (1)—Capability
outline; which involves the development of capability requirements, attributes, and
their applications, (2)—Analysis and Representation; i.e., the examinations of
results and interpretations for informed decision. The key contribution of this paper
is captured in the grey shaded section (sub-stage 2.2) of the process flow; where a
computational approach is proposed for evaluating the WCSC, and susceptibility
classiﬁcation of ICS workforce in an organisation. This capability evaluation model
could be employed as a means of initial assessment (ﬁrst time evaluation after a
typical system setup), or for subsequent re-assessment (where capability gaps and
remediation will be investigated from initial assessment). In the latter case, the
process model becomes valuable for determining the new state of the workforce,
and can provide a reference for creating remediation strategies.
3.1 Global Standards and Best Practices (Cyber Security)
The process of evaluating WCSC begins from a foundational stage of specifying
basic system/operational cyber security requirements. From the pool of existing
security publications, it is suggested that organisations should follow national and
international standards in Cyber security, and build the speciﬁc objectives and
strategies based on their unique operational scenarios. Due to the variability of
ICSs, their does not exist one security standard that completely covers all ICS
domain. A blend of ICS-oriented security provisions, such as UK Cyber security
Strategy, ISO/IEC 27000 series, NIST SP800 16, 18, 82 series, US DIACAP
8510.01, FIPS 199, 200, 201-2, etc. could be good references for organisations to
follow.
3.2 Evaluation (Methodology and Process)
In order to feed the WCSC evaluation model, it is necessary to collect various data
that implies workforce capability and response to security incidents, which is
typically dependent on; ICS policy guidelines and operational objectives, workforce
population size, evaluation timeline, and quality of expected feedback.
Data that representsWCSC is collected in a discrete format. The evaluation can be
performed for an individual and/or an organisation. Data collection could be com-
pleted through 5 methodologies: (i) Questionnaires, (ii) Interviews, (iii)
Observations, (iv) Attack Simulations (Penetration Testing), and (v) Gamiﬁcation.
These approaches can be employed individually or jointly. Data collection should
meet the deﬁned security evaluation requirements.
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3.3 WCSC Evaluation Modelling
Here, the discrete data from the collection of responses are fed into a computational
model as independent variables to obtain speciﬁc capability values. As WCSC is
described as a function of the Knowledge and Skills of the workforce, represented in
Eq. (1). A Capability Score Group is formulated to describe differing levels with
respective score allocations. Table 1 provides the deﬁnition of each level of WCSC,
and the WCSC score is evaluated from 5 to 1, implying from higher level to lower
level.
WCSC ¼ Knowledge Skillsð Þ ð1Þ
Mathematical Model The set of WCSC scores, denoted as A = {x1…x5}, can be
evaluated from the collection of feedbacks (directly or indirectly) from the selected
workforce. This can be modelled as a set of algebraic function where set A; x1…x5
describes a set of values that deﬁne the variable score allocations. The function
f(x) describes a speciﬁc Cumulative Score (CS), and it is the product of x and
number of occurrence (nx) in the feedback data. The value of f(x) is formulated in
Eq. (2). All possible values of f(x) forms a set of B.
CS ¼ f ðxÞ ¼ xnx ð2Þ
Following Table 1, Domain of A: {x |1 ≤ x ≤ 5}, Range of B: {f(x) = xnx} (CS of
each x in A; A = 1–5).
An individual p in the workforce could yield various occurrences of x values.
The sum of the cumulative scores of x values is used to represent the WCSC of the
individual p. Hence, the Quantitative Cumulative Score of the individual p, Qcsp,
representing knowledge awareness or diagnostic skills, formulated as Eq. (3).
Table 1 Levels of WCSC
Classiﬁcation Score
(allocation)
Capability translation
Higher capability 5 Higher likelihood to respond desirably, and manage both
indirect and targeted threats and cyber-attacks
High capability 4 High likelihood to respond desirably, and manage both
indirect and targeted threats and cyber-attacks
Moderate
capability
3 Moderate likelihood to respond desirably, and manage both
indirect and targeted threats and cyber-attacks
Low capability 2 Low likelihood to respond desirably, and manage both
indirect and targeted threats and cyber-attacks
Lower capability 1 Lower likelihood to respond desirably, and manage both
indirect and targeted threats and cyber-attacks
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Qcsp ¼
X5
i¼1
f xið Þ ð3Þ
8 xi ϵ x, and i = 1–5; in the domain of Cyber Security capability levels.
The Qcsp, representing knowledge awareness of an individual p is denoted as
Kap, and the Qcsp, representing the diagnostic skills, is denoted as Sdp, A geometric
mean offers the strengths of less submissiveness to the vast skewness influence of
very large values in a range of distribution [25], and appropriateness for normal-
ising the two quantities, such that neither quantity score alone perpetually domi-
nates the weighting of the ﬁnal result. Therefore, the WCSC score of an individual
p, CRp, could be derived using a geometric mean—Eq. (4).
CRp ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f xið ÞpjKaf xið ÞpjSd
 r
¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃKap  Sdp
p ð4Þ
With the CRp ratings of n individuals, representing the workforce under eval-
uation, it becomes feasible to obtain a possible workforce capability of an entire
organisation. This could be achieved by taking the Arithmetic Mean; AM of the set
of n individual capability scores—see Eq. (5). At the end, identiﬁcation and cate-
gorisation of workforce capability is achieved using 3 fractional (grouped) ratios,
1:2:3. The motive is to map the workforce into disparate capability groups with
unequal, successive priority ranges. Capability table, scattered chart, and line
graph, are used to (re)present the derived discrete results into quick human com-
prehensible format.
OWCC ¼
Pn
p¼1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
KaP  SdP
p 
n
ð5Þ
4 Theoretical Validation
An initial conjectural test of the WCSC evaluation model is presented using a
virtual test data to observe model behaviour, and examine its suitability for the
context of the study. This hypothetical validation approach is adopted for quick
valuation of the behaviour of the model relative to an expected behaviour, and also
due to non-availability of real analytical data about individual responses of a target
industrial workforce (implying IT security experts, engineers, ﬁeld operators,
technicians, and corporate users) under evaluation. Acquiring such primary data
from organisations is pretty difﬁcult. Most organisations are unwilling to disclose
security capability details of their employees, which in most cases often unveil to
external parties; personnel the cyber security weaknesses, and the vulnerabilities of
systems they operate. Organisations are always scared and apprehensive to provide
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third parties with lead-ins to utilize the data of their employees. Nobody is willing
to take the risks of having such intellectual details in wrong hands capable of
engineering exploitation for competitive advantage or outright sabotage. However,
if meaningful results could be derived by testing the model on the virtual data, then
the model could be applicable to real data, which could have similar pattern with
the virtual cases.
4.1 Basic Assumptions
Assume that some prior stages (Steps 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 2.1) of the evaluation
process-flow have been accomplished. The receipt of real response/feedback data
about the Cyber security capability of an arbitrary industrial workforce is also
presumed. Other assumptions employed to help meet the conditions of this typical
capability data aggregation procedure include: outline of organisation-speciﬁc
cyber security requirements, selection of target industrial workforce with initial
sample size of 50, a questionnaire with two sets of 15 questions for awareness and
skills respectively, each question has 5 multiple options with score allocations in
Table 1, initial aggregation and computation of workforce capability ratings for
knowledge and skills is accomplished in line with Eq. (4) above.
4.2 Data Generation and Priority Classiﬁcation
(Benchmarks)
Following the above assumptions, a random data function in Matlab is used to
generate values for the independent variables in the mathematical model.
Accordingly, dependent variables values, WCSC ranking, and the range of each
level are presented in Table 2, with scattered charts for visualising the positions of
the WCSC score shown in Fig. 3.
4.3 Results and Discussions
The WCSC ranking of n = 50 randomly generated pairs of vector values, repre-
senting the Qcsp in Knowledge (Kap), and Skills (Sdp) respectively; is based on the
WCSC score, which is the geometric mean of Kap and Sdp (Eq. 4). For instance,
Table 2 WCSC ranking Level of WCSC Ratio (upper limit) Priority range
High (h) 1/3 15 ≤ h ≤ 25
Moderate (m) 2/3 25 < m ≤ 50
Low (l) 3/3 50 < l ≤ 75
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Kap = 29, and Sdp = 63, yields a WCSC score of the individual CRp ﬃ 42:74,
which falls within a ‘moderate level’. Regardless whether the examined entity had a
‘moderate level’ knowledge or a ‘low level’ skills, the overall WCSC score is scaled
down to ‘moderate’. Another example, Kap = 71, and Sdp = 20, resulting in
CRp ﬃ 37:68.
Based on the WCSC ranking, 14 workforce members have ‘Low level’ of
WCSC. 34 workforce members have ‘Moderate level’ of WCSC, while 2 member
workforce yielded ‘High level’ of WCSC (see Fig. 3a). The organisational WCSC
is about 43.76, falling within the ‘Moderate level’ of WCSC ranking, and it has a
standard deviation (std) of 11.75. The standard deviation, which describes the
capability dispersion of the workforce relative to the average capability, illustrate
some measures of capability gaps.
The process repeated for n = 100 sample workforce, and the results show 28
‘Low level’ of WCSC, 65 ‘Moderate level’ of WCSC, and 7 ‘High level’ of WCSC
(see Fig. 3b). Organizational WCSC is about 42.35, with std ﬃ 12:38.
Generally, results suggest that regardless of the number of high-skilled IT
security workforce members in an industrial environment, the presence of other OT
workforce members with low WCSC could reduce overall organisational WCSC.
Contextually, it supports that the workforce members with low WCSC level are the
weak-links and more prominent targets of attacks. Metaphorically, with a strawed
portion in a brick wall, the wall becomes more vulnerable. Results also indicate that
a low capability of either knowledge or skills directly affects the overall WCSC.
A lack or low capability of both is worse still. Essentially, a workforce entity that is
abreast with knowledge in the emerging industrial Cyber security landscape, but
lacking the practical (responsive) skills and expertise to ensure security within
his/her domain, is as weak as the one who is skilled in managing and responding to
primordial cyber security threats and attacks, but does not continually keep-up with
updates in information and details on the changing security landscape. This
Fig. 3 Workforce cyber security capability visualization chart. a 50 Users, b 100 Users
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scenario represents a potential normal situation within an organisational domain,
where little emphasis is placed on cyber security assurance.
Based on observed results, it is suggested that the reduction or increase of mean
organisational WCSC depends on the application of potential remediation schemes
or control measures. Probable increase in organisational WCSC could be typically
explained as the outcome of the broad increase in individual workforce capabilities.
While introducing an individual to an organisation, his/her WCSC more or less
affects the organisational WCSC by introducing either a positive or a negative
weight on the current organizational WCSC. Practically, the individual WCSC
might introduce an intersecting effect that potentially widens already existing
weaknesses, thus dropping overall organisational WCSC. Under this circumstances,
it is projected that the mean WCSC will continue to decrease, because the mean
emerges as a results of the introduction of lower capability values. However, if the
requisite capability building and enhancement activities are identiﬁed and initiated,
positive weights could be exerted on the current organizational capability.
A potential improvement of WCSC, could be achieved; as more regular interactions
amongst the workforce allow them to share and improve the security awareness and
skills.
In the course of engaging remediation strategies, the knowledge from such
evaluation would enable organisations to identify those individuals who need to be
trained for the improvement of WCSC, and help organisations adopt a cost-effective
means of narrowing and appropriating remediation schemes, scopes, and resources
without waste or excessive spending. The opposite is usually the engagement of
all-purpose remediation after surveys and evaluations that yield outcomes, but with
uncertainties in capability levels and attributions about the industrial workforce.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In the modern computing insecurity era, where the human workforce has become
prime vectors and targets of successful industrial cyber incidents, understanding the
cyber security knowledge, and skills capabilities of the industrial personnel is key to
developing a more effective and skilled cyber workforce. Great deal of records
show that most successes in the malicious compromise of industrial networks and
systems have rested on the exploitation of weakness or vulnerabilities from the
workforce with low WCSC. Targeted attacks on the workforce become successful
for one of two reasons; workforce inappropriate or improper behaviour due to lack
of knowledge, skills enough to counteract malicious actions. The application of
strategic and systematic study and analysis can spur the industry towards good
cyber hygiene, and help sustain efﬁcient response to the necessary cyber security
factors, and thus reduce to the barest minimum; weak links in the system.
This paper addressed the importance of WCSC evaluation, which, is a means of
spurring organisations to improve their workforce cyber security assurance. Having
a WCSC evaluation could help organisations to identify speciﬁc cyber security
180 U.P. Daniel Ani et al.
threats and vulnerabilities, where security need to be improved, and help organi-
sations to setup prospective WCSC, in comparison to benchmarked cyber-attacks.
In general, the WCSC model could offer a starting point for managers or security
auditors to examine the respective postures of their workforce in terms of Cyber
security objectives. Correspondingly, the overall organisational WCSC is a means
of measuring the effectiveness of continuous cyber security efforts, and speed-up
problem-solving. Organisationally, WCSC evaluation model could also help the
regulation of resource application, tailor remediation, capacity building needs to
meet, changing and future capability trends, cyber security assurance measures, and
fundamental modiﬁcations in the way assurance is achieved.
Future works include; developing an evaluation tool that could integrate
seamlessly with the proposed framework, and validate the model with real indus-
trial data. Work will be done on developing ICS-speciﬁc cyber security metrics, and
formulation of a risk-based solution for enhancing cyber security assurance.
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